The Failed Promise of Workplace Health Regulation by Vladeck, David C.
Volume 111 Issue 1 Article 6 
September 2008 
The Failed Promise of Workplace Health Regulation 
David C. Vladeck 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Mining Engineering Commons, Oil, Gas, and 
Mineral Law Commons, and the Respiratory Tract Diseases Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David C. Vladeck, The Failed Promise of Workplace Health Regulation, 111 W. Va. L. Rev. (2008). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/6 
This Thinking Outside the Box: A Post-Sago Look at Coal Mine Safety is brought to you for free and open access by 
the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia 
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact 
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE FAILED PROMISE OF WORKPLACE HEALTH
REGULATION
David C. Vladeck*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 15
II. THE FLAWED STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF
WORKPLACE HEALTH HAZARDS ...................................................... 19
A. The Standard-Setting Process Set Forth in the MSH Act. ....... 19
B. The Standard-Setting Process in Practice ........................... 23
1. The Flaws in the Mine Safety and Health Act ........ 24
2. Obstacles to Promulgating Health Regulations
Imposed by Executive Orders and Other Statutes ...... 32
a. The Hidden Deterrence of Centralized
Regulatory Review ........................................... 32
b. The Barriers Imposed by Other Statutes ...... 36
C. The Micro-Politics of MSHA Standard-Setting ................... 39
II. C ONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 42
I. INTRODUCTION
The genesis for this symposium is the tragedy at the Sago mine, in West
Virginia, which took the lives of twelve miners, and left a thirteenth miner fight-
ing for his life.' Mine disasters, like the one at Sago and those that preceded and
followed it, rivet public attention. For a few fleeting days, the public is capti-
vated as rescue crews work around the clock, flailing against rock as they inch
towards the trapped miners. Too often, their efforts are in vain, with rescue
crews reaching trapped miners after the miners have perished. This happened
David C. Vladeck is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, where he
also serves as director of the Center on Health Regulation and Governance of the O'Neil Center
for National and Global Health Law and director of the Institute for Public Representation. He is
also a scholar with the Center for Progressive Reform. Prior to joining the Georgetown faculty,
Professor Vladeck was an attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group, where he handled,
among other things, occupational health and safety litigation. He participated in many of the
cases discussed in this essay, including cases involving the regulation of ethylene oxide, benzene,
formaldehyde, cadmium, hexavalent chromium and radon.
I The federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has dedicated a website page
to Sago-related material, including the agency's reports on the tragedy. See
http:llwww.msha.gov/sagonrine/sagomine.asp.
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not just in the Sago mine, but also, just two weeks later, when two miners died
2in the Aracoma Alma mine, also in West Virginia, and a year after that, when
the Crandall Canyon mine in Utah claimed the lives of six miners and three
would-be rescuers.3 The deaths of these miners stand as a stark testament to the
dangers of mining.4
Perhaps because of the drama of heroic rescuers putting their own lives
on the line to save their fellow miners, or perhaps because of our empathy with
miners trapped far below ground, the focus of mine safety efforts has long been
on preventing the upheavals, cave-ins, and explosions that trap and kill miners.
And notwithstanding the recent tragedies at Sago, Aracoma Alma and Crandall
Canyon, progress has been made. At least in the United States, mining is less
hazardous than it once was. There are fewer catastrophic accidents, the fatality
and injury rate of miners has dropped steadily over time, and we press forward
with efforts to make mines safer.
5
But the fact that some progress has been made in reducing risk should
not be seen as a warrant that mining is now "safe" or that the risks to miners of
injury or death on the job has been reduced to an acceptable level. That is not
the case. Miners still face inordinately high risks and these risks must be re-
duced.6
2 Ian Urbina, 2 Missing Workers Are Found Dead in West Virginia Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2006, at Al.
3 Dan Frosch & Jennifer 8. Lee, Rescue Halted at Mine After 3 Deaths and 6 Injuries, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2007, at AO.
4 The statistics are sobering. Between 1900 and 2007, MSHA reports that 104,659 miners
died in coal mine accidents. MSHA, Coal Fatalities for 1900 through 2007,
http://www.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2008). But that num-
ber, as large as it is, is dwarfed more than four-to-one by the number of deaths due to black lung.
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, Number of Deaths of U.S. Residents Aged
15 or Older with Pneumoconiosis Recorded as an Underlying or Contributing Cause on the Death
Certificate, 1968-1999, http://www.cdc.gov/docs/2004-146/detail/imagedetail.asp@imgid214.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2008). Public health experts have determined that by 1969, there were at
least 365,000 deaths due to black lung, with an additional 120,000 - totaling nearly one-half
million - deaths over the following thirty years. See Christopher W. Shaw, Center for the Study
of Responsive Law, Undermining Safety: A Report on Coal Mine Safety, at 7-8, available at
http://www.csrl.org/reports/UnderminingSafety.pdf [hereinafter Undermining Safety].
5 See generally MSHA, Mine Safety and Health At a Glance: U.S. Mining Fatalities 1978-
2007, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCTI0.HTM (last visited Mar. 4,
2008).
6 According to the most current statistics compiled by the Centers for Disease Control, as of
2005, coal miners faced a risk five to six times higher than other employees in suffering a fatal
accident on the job, with a risk of nearly 27 per 100,000 compared with the national average of
under 5 per 100,000. CDC, Fatality Rate in Mining Occupations and All Industry (Private)
(2005), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mininglstatistics/pdfs/pp3.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). U.S.
miners, however, are at far lower risk than their international counterparts. For example, in Chi-
na-the world's major coal producer-miners face far higher risks. See CHINA LABOUR BUREAU,
DECONSTRUCTING DEADLY DETAnIS FROM CHINA'S COAL MINE SAFETY STATISTICS (2006),
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/19316 (reporting nearly 6,000 coal miner deaths in China in 2005).
[Vol. I111
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/6
2008] THE FAILED PROMISE OF WORKPLACE HEALTH REGULATION 17
My submission is that, although much more work lies ahead to make
mines safer, and although the instinct to put the prevention of catastrophic
events above all other priorities is understandable, the singular focus on mine
safety has obscured an equally compelling need to protect miners' health.7 Pre-
venting catastrophic explosions, fires, and cave-ins is unquestionably important.
But so too is preventing miners from suffering painful and premature death due
to the slow-acting poisons that permeate mines, including coal dust, radon, sil-
ica, asbestos, arsenic, and other air contaminants. Indeed, over the past ten
years, black lung alone has claimed the lives of over 1,000 miners each year - a
number that vastly overshadows the annual death toll from safety hazards.8 And
the trend line is only getting worse. According to a recent study by the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), black lung rates are sky-
rocketing, to the point where, in 2007, NIOSH tests revealed that ten percent of
miners with twenty-five or more years of experience show black lung symptoms
- an incidence rate twice as high as a decade ago.9 It is time to worry about the
health of miners and not just their safety.'°
7 In fairness to MSHA, it probably bears noting that Congress too has responded to mining
disasters, but has otherwise not shown substantial interest in the health and safety of miners. The
1968 Farmington mine explosion, which claimed the lives of seventy-eight miners, galvanized
Congress to enact the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. MSHA, MINING
DISASTERS-AN EXHIBITION, http://www.msha.gov/disaster/disaster.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
Congress also rushed through the passage of the 2006 MINER Act in the aftermath of the Sago
mine tragedy.
8 See MSHA, CONTROLLING RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST IN UNDERGROUND MINES:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, at Slide 4,
http://www.msha.gov/s&hinfo/BlackLung/ControlDust2007/CTD2007.asp (follow "Introductory
Remarks" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (mortality chart of coal miner deaths attributable
to black lung from 1968 to 2004). In 1998, the Louisville Courier-Journal reported that
Every year, black lung disease kills almost 1,500 people who have worked in
the nation's coal mines. It's as if the Titanic sank every year, and no ships
came to the rescue. While that long-ago disaster continues to fascinate the na-
tion, the miners slip into cold, early graves almost unnoticed.
Dust, Deception and Death: Why Black Lung Has Not Been Wiped Out, LOUISVILLE COURIER-
JOURNAL, April 19, 1998, at Al available at http://courier-joumal.com/cjextra/dust/. The Na-
tional Black Lung Association similarly estimates that black lung claims the lives of 1,500 coal
miners each year, see Press Release, Mine Safety and Health Administration, Nation's Coal Min-
ers Take Advantage of Labor Department's Free Chest X-Rays (June 9, 2000) available at
http://www.msha.gov/media/press/2000/nr000609.htm.
9 See MSHA, CONTROLLING RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST IN UNDERGROUND MINES: LUNG
DISEASES OF COAL MINERS, at Slide 25,
http://www.msha.gov/s&hinfo/BlackLung/ControlDust2007/CTD2007.asp (follow "Lung Dis-
eases of Coal Miners" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
10 The statistics drive this point home. NIOSH's Dr. Petsonk, in his presentation on black
lung, pointed out that, according to NIOSH statistics, in 2002, twenty-seven coal miners died in
mining-related accidents while 854 former miners died due to black lung. See id. at Slide 32.
According to a report from the University of Texas, coal mining reduces a miner's life expectancy
by 1,100 days - a reduction that is less than smoking one pack of cigarettes a day (1,600 lost
days) but more than having cancer (980 days) or being 30 pounds overweight (900 days). Ameri-
3
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This is not just my view. It was also Congress's position forty years
ago when it amended the mine safety laws to make mine health regulation a
priority. After all, the federal statute that governs working conditions in mines
is entitled the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSH Act),"' and the agency that
Congress has assigned the responsibility of improving working conditions in
mines is called the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). When
Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,12 the
forerunner of the MSH Act, it directed the agency to place a premium on health
regulation and set an interim coal dust standard with the clear-cut expectation
that MSHA would expeditiously establish lower, more miner-protective stan-
dards for coal dust and other air contaminants. Forty years later the "interim"
standard is, astonishingly, still in effect, with no revision to the standard in sight.
My claim is that MSHA has focused on safety concerns to the exclusion
of health concerns. The agency's failure to address coal dust is the most visible,
and inexplicable, manifestation of the agency's single-mindedness. Whether
that focus has been myopic or justified is, at this juncture, beside the point.
What is now undeniable is that health hazards pose as much of a threat, if not
more of one, to the lives and well-being of miners than do the safety hazards
they face. The time has now come for MSHA to recognize this imperative and
to fulfill its statutory mandate to protect the health of miners as well as their
safety.'3
can Nuclear Society University of Texas Chapter, What is Shortening Your Life Expectancy?,
http://www.me.utexas.edu/-ans/info/health4.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
11 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (2000).
12 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 760 (establishing
the respirable dust standard now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 842(b)(2) (2000) (providing that "each
[mine] operator shall continuously maintain the average concentration of respirable dust in the
mine atmosphere during each shift to which each miner in the active workings of such mine is
exposed at or below 2.0 milligrams of respirable dust per cubic meter of air.")).
13 As best as I can tell, MSHA has only issued three health standards during its nearly forty
years of existence. The first one, air quality standards for abrasive blasting and drill dust control,
was issued in 1994 as the first step in a comprehensive air quality control standard-setting process
that was abandoned in 2002. See Air Quality: Health Standards for Abrasive Blasting and Drill
Dust Control, 59 Fed. Reg. 8318 (Feb. 18, 1994) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 56, 57, 58, 70 &
72); see also Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 358 F.3d 40 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (remanding MSHA's decision to abandon its air quality standard). The second one, a
standard for diesel particulate matter protection for both coal miners and metal and non-metal
miners, was issued on the last day of the Clinton Administration. See Diesel Particulate Matter
Exposure of Underground Miners, 66 Fed. Reg. 5526 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 72); Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Material and Nonmetal Miners, 66
Fed. Reg. 5706 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 57). This standard was developed
as a result of a court order compelling its issuance. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l
Union, 190 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The third, one for asbestos, was issued on February 29,
2008, seven years after the agency's Inspector General urged a reduction of the agency's outdated
standard which was twenty-times that of OSHA's level, which had been set twenty years ago.
After three years of standard-setting, MSHA has finally reduced its exposure level from two fibers
per cubic centimeter (f/cc) to 0.1 f/cc, which is the same as OSHA's, and lowered the excursion
limit for brief exposures to higher levels from ten f/cc (for 15 minutes) to one f/cc (for 30 min-
[Vol. I111
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Having thrown down the gauntlet to MSHA, I hasten to acknowledge
that my challenge is made with a full appreciation of the road-blocks in the
agency's path. It is hard enough to issue safety regulations. Mine owners often
resist the imposition of tougher safety regulations, arguing that the benefits do
not justify the costs. The Bush Administration generally supports deregulation,
and thus any regulatory proposal is certain to be greeted with suspicion by the
Administration's regulatory overseers at the Office of Management and Budg-
et's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. And even if a safety regula-
tion surmounts these hurdles and musters the Administration's backing, there
awaits the judgment of an often skeptical panel of Court of Appeals' judges.
As formidable as are these obstacles to safety regulation, they become
all the more forbidding for health regulations. By definition, health standards
address risks that are not immediate, that often have long latency periods, that
are difficult to measure accurately, and that often have no immediate, discern-
able effect. It is, I acknowledge, harder to make the case to protect workers
from slow-acting poisons like respirable dust, silica, radon and asbestos than it
is to protect them from catastrophic explosions and cave-ins. Protecting work-
ers from health risks can be costly. On the other hand, the benefits of future-
looking regulations designed to save lives and to avoid debilitating illnesses like
black lung accrue in the future, and thus are subject to heavy discounting, mak-
ing them more difficult to justify on economic grounds. 14 But the fact that the
bar to health regulations is set high does not mean that the hard work to promul-
gate them should go undone. Health risks like black lung claim far more min-
ers' lives than do catastrophic cave-ins and explosions. Perhaps even worse,
diseases like black lung condemn thousands of miners to live out their days
crippled by the devastating effects of progressive, chronic lung disease. 15 The
time has come for MSHA to pay attention to the health side of its statutory
mandate.
II. THE FLAWED STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF WORKPLACE
HEALTH HAZARDS
A. The Standard-Setting Process Set Forth in the MSH Act
If one were simply to read the Mine Safety and Health Act - and noth-
ing else - one would come away with the impression that the issuance of health
standards was both routine and a matter of high priority to MSHA. To begin
utes), which is the same as OSHA's. MSHA, Final Rule, Asbestos Exposure Limit, 73 Fed. Reg.
11,284 (Feb. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 56, 57 & 71).
14 Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
15 The Louisville Courier-Journal published a multi-part series on the ravages of black lung in
April 1998 entitled "Dust, Deception, and Death." The series is available at http://www.courier-
joumal.com/cjextra/dust/. The series included articles focusing on the victims of black lung; those
stories are available at http://www.courier-joumal.com/cjextra/dust/framevoices.html.
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with, the Act declares that "the first priority and concern of all in the coal or
other mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource
- the miner. ' 6 This provision, as well as the Act's other statements of purpose,
place Congress's concern for the health of miners on an equal footing with their
safety.'7 The statements of purpose go on to emphasize Congress's aim "to es-
tablish interim mandatory health and safety standards" to serve as a stopgap
while more protective standards are developed. 18 Indeed, the Act "direct[s] the
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Labor to develop
and promulgate improved mandatory health or safety standards to protect the
health and safety of the Nation's coal or other miners."' 9
The Act also contains detailed provisions that govern the development,
promulgation and revision of mandatory safety and health regulations. The Act
places a high premium on protecting miners. But it does so in a way that bifur-
cates responsibility for the development of standards between two agencies.
On the one hand, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is given
the responsibility of evaluating the constellation of scientific and technical is-
sues that form the foundation of standard-setting, ranging from assessments
about the nature and magnitude of the risk to miners to the most effective ways
to protect miners from that risk. On the other hand, the Secretary of Labor is
tasked with the responsibility of working with the stakeholders - mine opera-
tors, unions, other representatives of miners, and other interested parties - to
fine-tune the standard, to determine how best to control the risk and protect
workers, and ultimately, to get the standard issued, implemented, and enforced.
In keeping with this allocation of responsibility, the Act directs the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, "as soon as possible after November 9,
1977, but in no event later than 18 months after such date and on a continuing
basis thereafter" to identify "each toxic material ... which is used or found in a
mine" and to "determine whether such material . . . is potentially toxic at the
concentrations in which it is used or found in a mine., 20 The Secretary of
Health and Human Services is then directed to "submit to the Secretary [of La-
bor] all pertinent criteria regarding any such substances determined to be toxic.
as such criteria are developed.' Once this information is transmitted to the
Secretary of Labor, generally in the form of what is known as a "Criteria Docu-
ment," the Act gives the Secretary of Labor sixty days within which to "either
appoint an advisory committee to make recommendations with respect to a
16 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2000).
17 Id. § 801(b)-(g).
18 Id. § 801(g)(1).
19 Id. (emphasis added).
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mandatory health or safety standard" or "publish a proposed rule promulgating"
such a standard or publish a determination not to do so.
22
The Act also makes clear that the Secretary of Labor's key mission in
standard-setting is to protect miner health and safety. It directs the Secretary,
when "promulgating mandatory standards dealing with toxic materials," to "set
standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best available evi-
dence that no miner will suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity even if such miner has regular exposure to the hazards dealt with by such
standard for the period of his working life.,2 3 In addition to "the attainment of
the highest degree of health and safety protection for the miner," the Secretary is
also directed to consider "the latest available scientific data in the field, the fea-
sibility of the standards, and [the] experience gained under this and other health
and safety laws." 24 As is evident, the only constraint on the mandate that
MSHA regulates as strictly as it can to protect miner health is the requirement
that MSHA consider the "feasibility of the standards" in standard-setting.25 In
the Cotton Dust case, involving almost identical language in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the Supreme Court held that "feasibility" means that
which is "capable of being done., 26 As the Court found, the only limitation
imposed by a feasibility requirement is that the technology must be available to
enable industry to implement the standard and the standard may not be so costly
that it would cause serious economic dislocation to the regulated industry.27
Thus, the Act sends a strong signal that miner health is the preeminent goal of
Congress and that miner health should not be traded-off to save on compliance
costs.
The Act also recognizes the need to develop standards expeditiously.
As noted above, the Act contemplates that once the Department of Health and
Human Services has recommended standard setting, the process be initiated
within 60 days, or the Secretary of Labor appoint an advisory committee to eva-
luate the recommendation. To move the regulatory process along, the Act es-
tablishes a hybrid system of rule-making that, for the most part, follows the in-
formal notice and comment rule-process of the Administrative Procedure Act.
28
Although the MSH Act provides an opportunity for a hearing on request, it per-
22 Id.
23 Id. § 811 (a)(6)(A).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1981).
27 Id. at 530-32 (noting that OSHA's cotton dust standard might force some "marginal" em-
ployers to shut down, but that compliance was within the economic reach of the covered indus-
tries).
28 See 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000)).
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mits the Secretary to dispense with a hearing when no request is made.29 And
each step in the rule-making process is accompanied by a strict deadline that the
Secretary must adhere to, which, at least in theory, guarantees that standards
will be issued within a matter of months, not years.30
As noted, the Act has a section devoted just to respirable coal dust.
31
The section begins by providing that all coal mine operators "shall take accurate
samples of the amount of respirable dust in the mine atmosphere to which each
miner in the active workings of such mine is exposed" and spelling out in detail
the requirements for sampling.32 The section then sets interim standards: For
the first three years following the statute's enactment, mine operators were to
"continuously maintain the average concentration of respirable dust . . . at or
below 3.0 milligrams of respirable dust per cubic meter of air.",33 Thereafter,
mine operators were required to maintain average concentrations "at or below
2.0 milligrams of respirable dust per cubic meter of air [2 mg/m3]". 34 The Act
gave MSHA the authority to issue short-term permits to mines that could not
come into compliance with these standards within the time limits prescribed, but
that authority ended in 1975. 35 By that time, Congress expected that mines
would be in compliance with the 2 mg/m 3 interim standard and that MSHA
would be well on its way to setting a revised, more stringent standard. The sec-
tion provided that, "[b]eginning six months after" the statute's enactment, and
"from time to time thereafter," the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall establish, in accordance with section 811 of this title, a
schedule reducing the average concentration of respirable dust
in the mine atmosphere . . . below the levels established in this
section to a level of personal exposure which will prevent new
incidences of respiratory disease and the further development of
such disease in any person.
3 6
29 Id. § 81 l(a)(1)-(3). For a critique of "hybrid" rule-making requirements, see generally
Stephen Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 401 (1975).
30 Id. § 811 (a)(4)(A)-(C) (requiring, as a general rule, the Secretary to issue a standard within
ninety days of the certification of the hearing record). See generally In re United Mine Workers
of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the time limits in the MSH
Act generally must be observed). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-312, at 17-18 (1977) (explaining need
for timely action on MSHA standards); S. REP. No. 95-181, at 20 (1977).
31 30 U.S.C. § 842 (2000).
32 Id. § 842(a).
33 Id. § 842(b)(1).
34 Id. § 842(b)(2).
35 Id. § 842(b)(6).
36 Id. § 842(d).
[Vol. 111
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This provision clearly contemplated that, acting on the advice of the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor would
swiftly promulgate a revised standard below the interim standards to prevent the
incidence of respiratory disease. Congress thus recognized that the interim
standards did not provide an adequate measure of protection for miners and that
tougher standards had to be developed right away. Congress also recognized
that the solution to the black lung problem was to fix mines by forcing mine
owners to reduce exposures to protect workers, not to "fix" miners by placing
them in respirators. Forty years later, however, the interim standards are still in
effect, with no prospect of MSHA action on the horizon.
B. The Standard-Setting Process in Practice
On paper, the process for developing health standards looks seamless.
Scientists and mine health experts at the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices take on initial scientific steps of identifying and evaluating mine health
hazards, evaluating how seriously they threaten miners, and determining the
levels of exposure to toxic substances miners can tolerate without suffering
"material impairment of health or functional capacity. 37 Once the Department
of Health and Human Services, acting through the National Institute of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NISOH), completes that task, it sends a Criteria Doc-
ument to the Department of Labor, acting through MSHA, which then takes on
the responsibility for determining the technological and economic "feasibility"
of a standard and how a standard would be implemented by industry.
So the question then becomes: What happened? Given the attention
Congress paid to developing a standard-setting process that enlisted the partici-
pation of two major Cabinet Departments and the resources they could bring to
bear, why has this process borne so little fruit? And perhaps most importantly,
why has MSHA failed - for forty years - to revise the interim coal dust standard
Congress set in 1969?
The answer, I believe, is a complicated one that combines a regrettable
mix of politics, lack of will on the part of MSHA, stiff opposition from mine
operators, a Congress that simultaneously criticizes MSHA for poor perform-
ance while denying the agency the resources it needs to meet its considerable
responsibilities, flaws in the Act's structure that separate the science-based ex-
perts at NIOSH from the mining experts at MSHA, and the blizzard of require-
ments in addition to those imposed by the MSH Act that stifle health and safety
rulemaking generally. This essay addresses only the last two points, although
the remainder are also worthy of attention.38
37 30 U.S.C. § 81 1(a)(6)(A).
38 See generally Evaluating the Effectiveness of MSHA's Mine Safety and Health Programs
Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of J. Davitt McA-
teer) (making many of the same observations and noting that public health advocates are "mysti-
fied that MSHA's regulations to protect miners from black lung and silicosis are nearly 30 years
9
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1. The Flaws in the Mine Safety and Health Act
There are at least two serious structural flaws in the MSH Act that hob-
ble its ability to issue health standards. First and foremost, the Act separates the
NIOSH scientists from the MSHA regulators, and because the MSH Act paral-
lels the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the NIOSH scientific staff is re-
sponsible for providing scientific support for both agencies.39 One consequence
of that decision is that NIOSH has devoted most of its resources to broad-based
occupational hazards that are regulated by OSHA, not MSHA. Indeed, although
NIOSH has issued well over a hundred Criteria Documents since 1972, only two
have focused on health hazards regulated exclusively by MSHA: NIOSH's 1987
Report "Radon Progeny In Underground Mines - Criteria For A Recommended
old, its exposure limit for asbestos is 20 times less protective than OSHA's standard, and its rules
on mine rescue teams are seriously outdated.") available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/testimony/051607DavittMcAteerTestimony.pdf. For a critical
examination of the politics of MSHA standard-setting with an emphasis on the ongoing controver-
sies over the accuracy of the monitoring of respirable coal dust, see James L. Weeks, The Fox
Guarding the Chicken Coop: Monitoring Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, 1969-2000, 93
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1236 (2003). See also Brandy E. Fisher, Between a Rock and a Healthy
Place, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 544 (1998) (pointing out that "[flrom 1991 to 1997, more than
160 companies or individuals were convicted of or pled guilty to criminal acts of fraudulent dust
sampling" and explaining the high incidences of non-compliance with respirable dust standards by
mine operators); Sec'y of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recounting
some of the history of the dispute between MSHA and mine operators over dust sampling prac-
tices).
39 The standard-setting provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) and
the MSH Act are virtually identical. Compare, for example, 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A)-(B) with 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). Moreover, both statutes place considerable emphasis on NIOSH's role in
providing the scientific foundation for standard-setting. See 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1); 29 U.S.C.
655(b)(1). I do not mean to suggest that OSHA has been significantly more successful in setting
health standards than MSHA. In fact, OSHA's record of setting health standards is nearly as
dismal as MSHA's. OSHA set quite a number of health standards in its early years, often based
on NIOSH Criteria Documents. Since 1980, however, the agency has set only ten health stan-
dards, the vast majority of which have been issued as a result of court orders ruling that the agen-
cy had unreasonably delayed addressing a serious health problem. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health
Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v.
Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d
1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (litigation to force OSHA to issue a standard for ethylene oxide); In re Int'l
Chem. Workers Union v. Pendergrass, 958 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992); In re Int'l Chem. Workers
Union, 830 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (litigation to force OSHA to issue a standard for cadmium);
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002); Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 145 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998) (litigation
to force OSHA to regulate hexavalent chromium); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (litigation to force
OSHA to issue a standard for formaldehyde); In re United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rubber Mfrs.
Assoc., 783 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (litigation to force OSHA to issue benzene standard on
remand from the United States Supreme Court). See generally David C. Vladeck, Unreasonable
Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The Battle to Force Regulation of Ethylene Oxide, in
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Standard," and its 1995 Report, especially pertinent here, "Occupational Expo-
sure To Respirable Coal Mine Dust."40
As I will explain in a moment, the slow trickle of NIOSH Criteria Doc-
uments flowing to MSHA is not, in itself, the source of the problem. Having
received only two such documents in over thirty-five years, MSHA has nonethe-
less failed to address either hazard. Despite repeated promises, MSHA has still
not developed a standard for radon exposure, and at this rate, it never will.4I
Nor has MSHA concluded a new standard for respirable coal dust.
Before taking a closer look at MSHA's failure on that score, it is useful
to pause to explore why the bifurcation of responsibility might have some bear-
ing on MSHA's inability to promulgate health standards. In my view, the most
successful health and safety agencies are science-based agencies such as the
Food and Drug Administration, the Public Health Service, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. One thread that ties these agencies together is that science drives
their regulatory process. These agencies make regulatory decisions based on
science. They are also, in the main, protected from the overtly political forces
that often dominate decision-making in other, non-science agencies. Because of
their science-based focus, these agencies strive to build their workforce around
scientific staff. The agencies' regulatory and enforcement mission is set in sci-
entific terms. And the agencies must justify their decisions, to the public and to
reviewing courts, based on reputable science.
To be sure, with regard to its standard-setting mission, the same could
be said of MSHA. MSHA must also make its case for health regulation based
on science. The Supreme Court's "Benzene" decision provides the template
MSHA must follow. 42 MSHA must make a threshold finding that a health haz-
40 A list of all of NIOSH's Criteria Documents is available on the NIOSH website. NIOSH,
Criteria Documents, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pubs/criteria-datedesc-nopubnumbers.html (last
visited on Mar. 10, 2008). The Criteria Document for Respirable Coal Dust is also available
online. NIOSH, Criteria for a Recommended Standard, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/95-
106a.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
41 MSHA was sued in 1984 by the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union over
its failure to address the risks to hard-rock (non-coal) miners from radon. The D.C. Circuit dis-
missed the action based on MSHA's commitment to develop a standard that would be completed
no later than June 1987. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Needless to say, MSHA did not fulfill this commitment.
42 Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) [hereinafter
Benzene]. In the Benzene case, the Supreme Court reviewed OSHA's strict health standard for
occupational exposure to benzene, a solvent widely used in industry that had been linked to,
among other things, excess cases of leukemia, aplastic anemia, and other blood disorders in work-
ers exposed to benzene fumes. Based on its reading of provisions of the OSH Act that are essen-
tially identical to those in the MSH Act, OSHA argued that once it identifies an occupational
hazard, it is obligated to reduce the exposures to the lowest amount possible, constrained only by
notions of technological and economic feasibility. OSHA's argument was based on 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5), which directs the agency to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capac-
ity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard" over the course of his or her entire
11
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ard poses a significant risk to miners.43 Typically, such a finding would require
the preparation of a quantitative risk assessment that demonstrates that there is
evidence that, at exposure levels consistent with those found in mines, exposure
to the substance causes a material impairment to health.44 Once significant risk
is found, the agency then may proceed to standard-setting, an enterprise that is
also driven by scientific concerns. Standard-setting for health risks encom-
passes establishing various exposure limits (including daily, time-weighted av-
erage exposure limits that restrict a miner's overall daily exposure to a sub-
stance, and short-term exposure limits, that protect miners from high-burst,
short-duration exposures), medical monitoring, medical removal protection, and
other measures designed to carefully monitor the presence of the toxic substance
working life. The MSH Act is no different. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 l(a)(6)(A); Benzene, 448 U.S. at
639-40. But the Benzene Court found an important limitation on OSHA's regulatory authority.
Relying on 29 U.S.C. § 652(8), which defines the term "occupational safety and health standard,"
the Court held that Congress's direction that such standards be "reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate to provide safe or healthful employment," did not give OSHA license to regulate until it could
show that the toxic material actually imposed a "significant risk" on workers. Id. at 642-46. Once
OSHA finds significant risk, the Act then directs OSHA to drive down exposures as much as
possible. But rule-making must be preceded by a finding of significant risk. In the Court's view,
it
is the Agency's responsibility to determine, in the first instance, what it con-
siders to be a "significant" risk. Some risks are plainly acceptable and others
are plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a
person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk
clearly could not be considered significant. On the other hand, if the odds are
one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% ben-
zene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant
and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it. Although the Agency
has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, it does have an obliga-
tion to find that a significant risk is present before it can characterize a place
of employment as "unsafe." 448 U.S. at 655.
43 See generally Kennecott Greens Creek Mining Co. v. MSHA, 476 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (applying significant risk analysis in judicial review proceeding regarding an MSHA health
standard). There is one textual difference in the MSH and OSH Acts that might justify a different,
and less exacting, approach by MSHA. In Benzene, the Court construed section 3(8) of the OSH
Act as imposing a significant risk requirement on the agency. But there is no analogue to section
3(8) in the MSH Act. The D.C. Circuit has taken note of this disparity in the wording of the two
Acts and has suggested, in dicta, that MSHA might not be required to make a significant risk
determination as a precondition to regulating. Nat'l Mining Ass'n. v. MSHA, 116 F.3d 520, 527-
28 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
44 Although the Benzene Court suggests that OSHA would not be required "to support its
finding that a significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty," the Court goes
on to say that the agency "must support its finding that a certain level of risk exists by substantial
evidence." 448 U.S. at 655 & n.62. This evidence must be consistent with "a body of reputable
scientific thought." Id. at 656. The clear message is that significant risk determinations must be
science-based, and the agency must be able to justify its finding on the basis of substantial scien-
tific support. See generally Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1486-
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in the workplace and to provide full protection for the miner.45 All of these de-
cisions are based on science and medical considerations.
46
My submission is that developing science-based standards becomes dif-
ficult, if not impossible, if the agency responsible for making these decisions is
largely dependent on another agency for scientific expertise. But MSHA and
NIOSH are separated in every way possible. As a formal matter, they are parts
of different agencies with different leadership, different cultures and orienta-
tions, and different agendas. As a practical matter, they are separated physi-
cally. As a result, their staffs do not have the kind of day-to-day interactions
that is essential to foster team-building. So the first problem MSHA faces is
that it is an agency with a science-driven mission without a strong scientific
infrastructure of its own.
The second problem MSHA faces is that the statute does not require the
agency to set priorities that reflect actual risk in the workplace. Indeed, nothing
in the Act addresses priority-setting, let alone requires MSHA to allocate its
standard-setting resources in a way that optimizes miner health. The absence of
such a requirement enables the agency to gravitate towards safety standards.
MSHA has done so for obvious reasons. Safety standards address evident risks,
they impose far less significant compliance costs on mine operators than do
health standards, and it is easier to persuade mine operators to accept safety
standards, since operators have strong and obvious short-term economic incen-
tives to avoid safety hazards that pose an immediate threat to a mine's produc-
tivity as well as a miner's health.47
45 See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing elements of OSHA health standard); Pub.
Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
46 MSHA followed this approach in its rulemaking to protect miners from diesel exhaust.
Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Coal Miners, 66 Fed. Reg. 5526 (Jan. 19,
2001).
47 Some scholars argue that, based solely on cost-benefit grounds, safety standards should be
preferred by agencies because, dollar-for-dollar, they provide for higher savings than do health
standards. See, e.g., John F. Morall Ill, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25 (1986) (argu-
ing that, as a general rule, safety standards are more cost beneficial than health standards). These
arguments, in my view, are misplaced for several reasons. First, they generally overlook the fact
that health regulations are rarely imposed simply to avoid cancer deaths, but the cost-benefit ana-
lyses they rely on only count cancer deaths avoided as a benefit. For instance, Morall singles out
the OSHA formaldehyde rule as one being exceptionally costly (he claims that it costs $72 billion
per life saved). Id. at 34. Apart from the fact that Morall discounts benefits but assumes that
agency estimates of costs are accurate, Morall looks only at lives saved. Id. However, the formal-
dehyde rule was promulgated by OSHA mainly to safeguard workers from non-cancer risks, and
Morall neglects to mention that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded the standard to OSHA because it found that the agency had not adequately justi-
fied the standard it set, because the Court thought it might be too lax. See Pendergrass, 878 F.2d
at 389. Moreover, these arguments rely too heavily on cost-benefit analyses that are heavily
weighed against regulatory efforts that produce benefits in future years. See generally Frank
Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553 (2002); Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy
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Both of these flaws have come into play with regard to respirable coal
dust. As noted, NIOSH did not issue a Criterial Document for coal dust until
1995 - well over twenty years after Congress directed it to do so. NIOSH did so
shortly after MSHA took its first, preliminary steps towards rulemaking. In
January 1995, the Secretary established an Advisory Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Pneumoconiosis Among Coal Mine Workers (Advisory Committee) to
"make recommendations ... for improved standards, or other appropriate ac-
tions," to eliminate pneumoconiosis and silicosis through the control of respir-
able coal mine dust.
48
In September 1995, NIOSH finally issued its Criteria Document rec-
ommending standards "to reduce or eliminate health impairment from exposure
to respirable coal mine dust. ' 49 The Criteria Document called for cutting the
interim standard of 2.0 milligrams of respirable dust per cubic meter of air (2
mg/m 3) in half. NIOSH made the recommendation based on "an evaluation of
[the] health effects data, sampling and analytical feasibility, and technological
feasibility."50 NIOSH went on to emphasize that its recommended exposure
limit "does not ensure that miners exposed at this concentration over a working
lifetime will have a zero risk of developing occupational respiratory disease."
Therefore, NIOSH urged MSHA to adopt a standard that would impose addi-
tional measures to protect miners' health, including "(1) keeping worker expo-
sures as far below the [exposure limit] as feasible through the use of engineering
controls and work practices, (2) frequent monitoring of worker exposures, and
(3) participation of miners in the recommended medical screening and surveil-
lance program.,
51
NIOSH's claim that its recommended exposure limit would still leave
miners at risk was driven home by the agency's risk assessments, which are
quite sobering. Although the risk to some extent depends on the nature of the
coal being mined (and its carbon content), NIOSH's assessment showed very
high levels of risk remain regardless of the kind of coal mined even at its rec-
ommended limit 1.0 mg/m 3 - remaining risks range from a high of well over
100 to a low of fourteen excess cases of lung impairment over a working life
per 1000 miners. 52 This risk determination far exceeds the 1 per 1000 threshold
the Supreme Court staked out in Benzene. MSHA also acknowledged that the
Math, 90 GEo. L.J. 2341 (2002); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 7
(1998).
48 Advisory Committee; Establishment, 60 Fed. Reg. 5947, 5948 (Jan. 31, 1995). See also In
re Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 231 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (setting forth chronol-
ogy of the development of the respirable dust rule through 2000).
49 NIOSH, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: OCCUPATIONAL ExPOSURE TO
RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST 9, http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/95-106.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2008).
50 Id. at iii.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 117-18
[Vol. 111
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science on the adverse health effects of respirable coal dust on miners had long
demonstrated that the interim 2.0 mg/m3 was far too high to protect miner
health.53
NIOSH did not explain its delay in preparing its Criteria Document.
But the Document has many tell-tale signs that NIOSH had the information it
needed to prepare it for quite some time. For one thing, most of the health ef-
fects data NIOSH relies on was available to the agency for years, if not decades,
prior to 1995.54 Moreover, NIOSH's own records demonstrates that, at no point
since the government started keeping records on the incidence of black lung, has
the level of the disease gone below four percent of miners with twenty-five
years of mining experience.5 Since the definition of "black lung" is the mate-
rial impairment of health and functional capacity, a disease which affects no
fewer than four percent of eighty thousand or so miners in the United States,
56
the risk from respirable coal dust plainly satisfied the significant risk test ex-
plained in Benzene.
MSHA published a response to the NIOSH Criteria Document on April
25, 1996, announcing its intentions to develop a proposed rule "derived from the
recommendations in the Document" that would "address enhanced protections
for surface and underground coal miners from exposure to respirable coal mine
dust and crystalline silica. ' 57 MSHA stated that it would "defer full develop-
ment" of the proposed rule until it had before it the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee. 8
The Advisory Committee submitted its report to the Secretary on No-
vember 14, 1996.59 The report contained twenty wide-ranging recommenda-
tions to reduce miners' risk from respirable dust.60  On January 24, 1997,
53 Id. at 42-60.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 45.
56 According to a report issued by the National Mining Association and the Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration, since 1995, there have been on average approxi-
mately 75,000 to 80,000 miners working in coal mines in the United States. See NATIONAL
MINING ASSOCIATION, TRENDS IN U.S. COAL MINING 1923-2007,
http://www.nma.org/pdf/c-trends-mining.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). The number of miners
has increased to over 80,000 in recent years, undoubtedly in response to the growing demand for
coal. Il
57 Response to National Institute for Occupational Safety (NIOSH) Criteria Document, 61 Fed.
Reg. 18,308, 18,308 (Apr. 25, 1996) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 70 & 71).
58 Id. at 18,309.
59 Response to Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Elimination of Pneumo-
coniosis Among Coal Mine Workers, 62 Fed. Reg. 3717, 3717 (Jan. 24, 1997).
60 See Report of the Secretary of Labor's Advisory Committee on the Elimination of Pneumo-
coniosis Among Coal Mine Workers,
http://web.archive.org/web/20010320072824/http://www.msha.gov/MEDA/REPORTS/PNEUCV
R.HTM (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). See also Press Release, MSHA, Recommendations to Abolish
Black Lung Issued Today (Nov. 20, 1996),
http://www.msha.govlMEDIAIPRESS/1996/NR961120.HTM. Although the report does not
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MSHA published a response to the Advisory Committee Report, backtracking
somewhat from its prior pledge to begin rulemaking. This time the agency stated
that it was considering both rulemaking and other actions, such as internal ad-
ministrative or policy changes.61 MSHA also observed that "[m]any of the rec-
ommendations [were] general in nature and would require further development
by MSHA to be suitable for publication as a proposed rule.,
62
Finally, in April 1999, MSHA published its semi-annual agenda giving
notice that it expected to publish, by June 1999, an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) aimed at lowering the permissible exposure limit for
dust. 63 MSHA did not publish an ANPRM in June, or indeed, in any time there-
after.
But MSHA continued to maintain that an ANPRM on coal dust was in
the offing. To force MSHA to give miners some protection while the agency
proceeded with its rulemaking, on January 13, 2000, the United Mine Workers
of America (UMW) went to court to force the agency to take enforceable meas-
ures to protect miners from excessive exposure to coal dust. The UMW filed a
petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit arguing that MSHA had engaged in unreasonable delay by failing to
address the key recommendations proposed by the Advisory Committee regard-
ing the long-contentious issue of coal dust sampling. To remedy the agency's
failure, the UMW asked the Court to compel MSHA to begin rulemaking with
appear to be available on the internet, the agency's progress in implementing the report's recom-
mendation is set forth on a chart that is available on the agency's website. See MSHA, STATUS
REPORT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
ELIMINATION OF PNEUMOCONIOSIS AMONG COAL MINE WORKERS,
http://www.msha.gov/S&HINFO/NUMOADV/ISSUI&2.HTM (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
61 Response to Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Elimination of Pneumo-
coniosis Among Coal Mine Workers, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3717.
62 Id. In the interim, MSHA took a number of modest measures to address the risk of coal
dust; in
November 1998, MSHA published and began distributing a booklet for coal
miners on the health hazards of respirable coal mine dust. From May through
August 1999, MSHA tested and analyzed the effectiveness of new cassette fil-
ter designs for dust-sampling devices. In August 1999, MSHA published a
book outlining techniques for controlling respirable dust in longwall mining.
In November 1999, MSHA launched a pilot program, "The Miners' Choice
Health Screening," under which MSHA will offer free confidential x-rays to
detect work-related lung disease to at least 20,000 coal miners nationwide.
See The Secretary of Labor & the Assistant Secretary of Labor's Response to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at 9, In re Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America, 231 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(No. 01-1010), available at 2000 WL 35574745.
63 Occupational Exposure to Coal Mine Dust: Lowering Exposure Limit, 64 Fed. Reg. 21, 519
(Apr. 26, 1999) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 70-71 & 90). The same agenda also noted that it
was considering promulgating revisions to its air quality standard to lower the permissible expo-
sure limits to hazardous air contaminants. The agency said that it anticipated issuing a notice of
proposed mlemaking on these revisions by December 1999. Id.
[Vol. I111
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the aim of requiring (1) MSHA to assume full responsibility for all respirable
coal mine dust compliance sampling; (2) continuous monitoring for respirable
coal mine dust; (3) MSHA to guarantee that miners have full rights to partici-
pate in the dust sampling program; and (4) MSHA to ensure that sampling con-
template miners' full exposure to respirable dust (i.e. beyond 8 hours per day
and 40 hours per week). 64 The UMW's petition, it bears noting, did not contain
a request that the Court compel MSHA to undertake rulemaking to reduce the
exposure limit from 2.0 mg/m3 to 1.0 mg/m3, since the agency had already an-
nounced it was moving towards such a rulemaking on its own accord.
On July 7, 2000, the Secretary published notices of two proposed rule-
makings aimed at restructuring the respirable dust sampling program for under-
ground coal mines. The proposed rules would have given MSHA more author-
ity to employ better sampling methods to determine whether coal mine operators
are complying with the permissible exposure limit for respirable coal mine
dust 65 and required each underground coal mine operator to have a verified mine
ventilation plan. 66 The proposed rulemakings were a direct response to the
67UMW's petition, and after they were issued, the D.C. Circuit determined that
the proposals rendered the union's challenge moot, and, therefore, dismissed the
union's claim of unreasonable delay.
68
After the Court dismissed the action, the 2000 Presidential election,
with a bit of help from the Supreme Court of the United States,69 swept Presi-
dent George W. Bush into office. That ended MSHA's effort to address coal
dust. The new Bush Administration promptly displayed a renewed emphasis on
deregulation. As a result, the promised proposed rulemaking on respirable coal
dust, as well as the subsidiary rulemakings on sampling and ventilation, were
quietly dropped. MSHA formally withdrew its promise to publish a proposed
rule to reduce the coal dust standard in its Fall 2002 Unified Agenda, stating that
the agency "is currently developing regulatory alternatives to issues relating to
respirable coal mine dust. Therefore, we are withdrawing this item at this
time. 7° Since then, the agency has done nothing further to protect miners from
respirable coal dust, other than initiate a worker education campaign that fea-
64 This discussion is drawn from the Court's opinion in the UMW case, In re Int'l Union,
United Mine Workers of Am., 231 F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
65 Determination of Concentration of Respirable Coal Mine Dust, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,068 (July 7,
2000) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 72).
66 Verification of Underground Coal Mine Operators' Dust Control Plans and Compliance
Sampling for Respirable Dust, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,122 (July 7, 2000) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts.
70, 75 & 90).
67 See id. at 42,129, 42,133, 42,138-39 & 42,140-41.
68 See In re Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 231 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (setting
forth chronology of the development of the respirable dust rule through 2000).
69 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
70 Occupational Exposure to Coal Mine Dust: Lowering Exposure Limit, 67 Fed. Reg. 74,770,
74,770-71 (Dec. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71 & 90).
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tures posters and logos ostensibly designed to heighten miner awareness of
black lung.71
2. Obstacles to Promulgating Health Regulations Imposed by Ex-
ecutive Orders and Other Statutes
Thus far, this essay has focused on the limitations in the MSH Act (and
the OSH Act as well, for that matter) that hobble the ability of the agency to
promulgate health standards. But there are serious obstacles that these agencies
confront, in addition to those embedded in their organic statutes, that make the
promulgation of health standards a daunting task. Taken together, these re-
quirements have sapped the collective ability of our public health agencies to do
their jobs with anything approaching reasonable dispatch. Some of these obsta-
cles have been imposed by Congress; others by the President through Executive
Order; still others by the agency's own internal review process. But collec-
tively, these obstacles have come close to rendering health regulation a thing of
the past - something agencies engage in only when compelled to do so by court
order or congressional mandate, or when spurred on by overwhelming political
consensus.
a. The Hidden Deterrence of Centralized Regulatory
Review
The most formidable of these obstacles is the one imposed by central-
ized regulatory review. Although all Presidents since President Ford have em-
ployed some form of centralized review of agency regulations, systematic,
wholesale review of regulations did not begin until the Reagan Administration.
Just a month after his inauguration, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,291 (the Executive Order), which required agencies to prepare detailed
Regulatory Impact Analyses specifying the costs and benefits of all proposed
"major" rules. The Order provided that, unless otherwise forbidden by law, an
agency could not undertake rulemaking unless "the potential benefits to society.
outweigh the costs," and the agency selected the regulatory option "involving
,,72the least net cost to society. The Order further required agencies to submit
drafts of all proposed and final rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), a component of the Office of Management and Budget, before
publication in the Federal Register, and publication could not proceed without
OIRA' s approval.
From the outset, Congress was troubled by the dominant and often ob-
structionist role OIRA played in rulemakings. OIRA delayed and weakened
71 See MSHA, Control the Dust Program, (2007),
http://www.msha.gov/FocusOn/ControltheDust2007/ControltheDust2007.asp.
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rules, met in secret with industry representatives, overrode agency determina-
tions on complex matters of science, and otherwise thwarted the ability of the
regulatory agencies to do their jobs. 73 During 1982-83, the House held no fewer
than seven hearings to examine health and safety rules seriously delayed or
weakened by OIRA.74 And when the first challenge to the constitutionality of
OIRA's meddling in agency rulemaking came before an appellate court, the
Chairmen of the five House Committees, having jurisdiction over regulatory
agencies, filed a brief setting forth a blistering critique of OIRA review. Here is
just a brief sampling of what the five Chairmen said:
The amici Congressmen object to the systematic usurpation of
legislative power by OMB pursuant to Executive Order 12,291.
* * * Executive Order 12,291 is the cornerstone of a steadily
growing Presidential apparatus, the effect of which is to contra-
vene explicit Congressional delegations of authority, to subvert
meaningful public participation in and judicial review of federal
regulations, and to impose substantive standards on decision-
makers foreign to the statutes they administer. Unless it is
checked, the program embodied in Executive Order 12,291 will
fundamentally damage the administrative process by which our
laws are implemented, the legislative system by which our laws
are enacted and monitored, and the separation of powers upon
which our system of government rests.75
In 1993, shortly after taking office, President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,866 to make a number of significant modifications to the Reagan Ex-
ecutive Order. The most important, in my view, was to inject transparency in
the OIRA review process.76 The Clinton Order also cut back on the number of
"significant" agency rules reviewed by OIRA. It also required OIRA, as a gen-
73 See generally Vladeck, supra note 39; Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive
Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 193 (1981).
74 See, e.g., OMB Control of OSHA Rulemaking: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. of Gov't Operations, 97 h Cong. (1982); Infant Formula: The Present Danger: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 971h Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses (Part 3),
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98"' Cong. (1983).
75 Brief of Representatives John D. Dingell, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Jack Brooks, Augustus
Hawkins, and William D. Ford as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 7-8, Pub. Citizen
Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1252). Because the
Court ruled against OSHA on the merits, it did not reach the constitutional question. Pub. Citizen
Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
76 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 6(b) & 6(c); Regulatory Planning & Review, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
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eral rule, to complete its review of proposed and final rules within ninety calen-
dar days. And it required all agencies, including the so-called independents, to
prepare an annual regulatory plan outlining all important regulatory actions the
agency intended to take during that fiscal year. The plans had to be personally
approved by agency heads.77 Even with the adjustments made by President
Clinton, centralized review of the regulatory output of administrative agencies
has never accomplished its objective of making our regulatory agencies better
serve the public. Indeed, the ultimate irony is that if OIRA's review process
were subjected to cost-benefit analysis, OIRA review would flunk. The amount
of time, energy, money and, at times, political capital, that goes into satisfying
OIRA that a rule is worthy of publication dwarfs any conceivable benefits that
flow from the process. We have now had a twenty-five year experiment with
centralized review. Judged by any legitimate measure, it is time to declare the
experiment a failure and move on. There are several reasons for my conclusion.
(i) Centralized review is a one-way ratchet. OIRA presses agencies
to do less to protect the public health, not more. Agencies do not complain that
OIRA is forcing them to do more; they complain that OIRA is forcing them to
weaken required protections.
OIRA's insistence that agencies do less, not more, stems from its singu-
lar focus on "least net cost options" - or, in other words, minimizing regulatory
compliance costs. The Executive Order requires agencies to perform cost-
benefit analysis, which many experts claim is inherently anti-regulatory.7 8 My
own litigation experience bears this out. I have represented workers and labor
unions in litigation to force OSHA to protect workers from exposure to many
highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals, including ethylene oxide, cadmium,
hexavalent chromium, formaldehyde and benzene.79 In each case, OIRA was an
obstacle to the agency's action. Part of OIRA's objection was its unwillingness
to place any value on important health benefits of regulation - including avoid-
ing cancers, miscarriages, genetic damage that might cause infertility or birth
77 Harvard Law School Dean Elena Kagan has traced the development of the Clinton Execu-
tive Order in Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
78 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportion, 107 YALEL. J. 1981 (1998).
79 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Pub. Citizen
Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (represented hospital and health
care workers in case requiring OSHA to regulate ethylene oxide, a potent carcinogen and terato-
gen); In re Int'l Chemical Workers Union, et. al., 958 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992); In re Int'l
Chemical Workers Union, 830 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (represented labor unions in successful
suit to compel OSHA to regulate cadmium, a potent lung carcinogen); Pub. Citizen Health Re-
search Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 145 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998) (representing labor unions in
suit to compel OSHA to regulate hexavalent chromium, a potent lung and liver carcinogen); Int'l
Union, UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (represented labor unions in suit to
force OSHA to regulate formaldehyde).
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defects, and kidney failure that might require dialysis or transplant - because
they were too difficult to quantify. While the anticipated costs of regulation are
generally easier to estimate (and overestimate), the benefits of regulation are
notoriously difficult to quantify and are often downplayed or ignored by OIRA.
And even when OIRA places a value on a benefit or regulation, it discounts
those values heavily. Indeed, lives that are going to be lost twenty or thirty
years down the road are devalued to the point of insignificance.
(ii) There is also the problem of competence. By way of example, the
next new car you buy is almost certain to have an indicator on the dashboard to
warn you when the car's tires are under-inflated. Congress required this safety
feature after a spate of deadly roll-over crashes caused, in part, by under-inflated
tires. Congress directed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to issue regulations requiring the installation of devices to gauge the
pressure in cars' tires. NHTSA's proposal would have required automobile
manufacturers to install devices that would detect under-inflated tires in virtu-
ally all cases. OIRA, however, insisted that NHTSA permit the installation not
only of the device NHTSA's engineers determined was best, but also allow
manufacturers to install a far less effective (and cheaper) device favored by the
auto industry. Not surprisingly, NHTSA did what it was told. Empowering
OIRA economists to second-guess highly technical judgments made by expert
agencies is not good government. Ultimately, a court overturned the OIRA-
dictated decision and directed NHTSA to require the installation of the more
effective devices. But the introduction of this important, life-saving device was
delayed for years because of OIRA's interference. This is hardly an isolated
case.
80
(iii) There is enormous delay built into OTRA review which has led
to further ossification of the regulatory process.8' The regulatory process is
so overlain with procedural and regulatory requirements that agencies cannot
get their work done in a reasonable time. It now takes OSHA a decade or more
to promulgate a standard to protect workers from exposure to toxic substances
even when compelled to act by the courts. 82 As we have seen, MSHA has cho-
sen to throw up its hands and abandon health standards rulemaking for any sub-
stance that might require independent work on MSHA's part. While the rule-
making process grinds glacially ahead, if at all, workers are exposed to unrea-
80 OIRA's meddling in the tire pressure rule, and the back and forth between industry,
NHTSA, and OIRA, is recounted in Public Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003). For a
more recent, but equally troubling, example of OIRA's improper meddling, see Public Citizen v.
FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (setting aside on safety grounds a rule extending the
hours truck drivers may drive after O1RA intervened on behalf of trucking companies to reverse
the agency's proposed rule reducing the hours).
81 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy,
46 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1994); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rule-
making Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
82 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002).
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sonable risks to their health and well-being. Other agencies face comparable
delays. Much of the delay can be traced back to the requirements imposed by
the Executive Order.
b. The Barriers Imposed by Other Statutes
Not only has the President encumbered the rulemaking process, so too
has Congress. 83 Congress has passed a number of statutes that add to an agen-
cy's regulatory burden. Chief among these are the Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980,84 the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,85 the Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act/Regulatory Accountability and Reform Act of 1995,86 and the Infor-
mation Quality Act of 2000.87 Each of these statutes imposes considerable in-
formation-gathering and analytical burdens on regulatory agencies.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to prepare a Regula-
tory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) whenever they propose a rule that might have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small businesses.88
Agencies are required to consider ways to minimize the impact of regulation on
small businesses, including the suitability of setting "differing compliance or
reporting requirements" that "take into account the resources available to small
entities," the "simplification of compliance and reporting" obligations for small
entities, and "an exemption from coverage" of the regulation for small entities.89
In preparing an RFA, agencies have an obligation to conduct outreach efforts to
ensure that small businesses are informed of the pending regulatory proposal
and have an opportunity to weigh in before the agency finalizes its rule.90 As
originally enacted, the Act prohibited judicial review of agency determinations
under the Act, and, as a result, agencies did not strictly comply with its require-
ments. In 1996, Congress reinvigorated the Act by expressly authorizing judi-
cial review of an agency's compliance with both the procedural and substantive
83 In 2000, Professor Mark Seidenfeld published an article setting forth 110 separate proce-
dural steps - some imposed by statute; others by Executive Order - that an agency might have to
complete if every analytical requirement applied to a proposed rule. Most of the requirements
Professor Seidenfeld identifies would be applicable to health standards promulgated by MSHA.
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 533, 536-37 (2000).
84 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000). See generally Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act, 1982 DuKE L.J. 213 (1982).
85 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2000). See generally William Funk, The Paperwork Reduction
Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1987).
86 2 U.S.C. §§ 658, 1501-1503, 1531-1536, 1571 (2000).
87 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); reprinted as note to 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000).
88 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604 (2000).
89 Id. § 603(c) (2000).
90 Id. § 609.
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requirements of the Act.9' The RFA is now made part of the record on review
when there is a judicial challenge to the agency's rule, and a reviewing court
may consider the RFA in determining whether the agency's action was arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.92 MSHA's obligations under the Regulatory Flexibility Act are substantial.
Most coal mines qualify as "small businesses" under the Act9 3 and therefore
MSHA must be attentive to the requirements of the Act in standard-setting.
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) requires agencies to engage in
full-blown notice and comment rulemaking before imposing any reporting or
record-keeping requirement on a regulated party. 94 The agency must determine
that the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the
agency's functions, does not duplicate information otherwise available to the
agency, is tailored to minimize burden on small business, and uses technology
to reduce burden.95 The agency must also obtain approval from OIRA. ff OIRA
approves the requirement, it then assigns it a "control number"; agencies are
forbidden from imposing a penalty for non-compliance with an information
collection requirement in the absence of an OIRA-issued control number.96
MSHA would have to follow the PRA twice in any significant health rulemak-
ing; first, in order to collect the information about exposures and feasibility,
MSHA would have to determine that the collection was necessary and obtain
OIRA's approval before undertaking it; and second, because health standards
generally depend on the dissemination of information to workers to help them
safeguard their health, MSHA has to comply with all of the requirements of the
PRA, including obtaining OIRA's approval, for the information-dissemination
provisions of its standards.97
91 Id. § 611, codifying Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 242, 100 Stat. 847, 865 (2000).
92 Id.
93 Id. § 601(3) (2000) (defining "small business" to mean a business that meets the definition
of a small business under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(2) (2000), which gives the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA) broad discretion to define small busi-
nesses by industrial sector and other criteria). After the enactment of SBREFA, the SBA deter-
mined that a large mine was one that employed more than 500 employees; any mine with 500 or
fewer employees was deemed to be a small mine and therefore a small business or small entity
subject to the full requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. See, e.g., Diesel Particulate
Matter Exposure of Underground Coal Miners, 66 Fed. Reg. 5526, 5689-92 (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 72) (Jan. 19, 2001) (explaining applicability of SBREFA to MSHA health standards
rulemaking).
94 44 U.S.C. §§ 3506, 3507 (2000).
95 Id.
96 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
97 The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that the PRA applied to regulatory
information dissemination requirements in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26
(1990). Congress amended the Act in 1995 to overrule Dole.
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Adding to MSHA's burden are the detailed, analytical requirements that
must be prepared to accompany significant regulatory measures, requirements
that are in addition to, and more exacting than, those imposed by the Executive
Order. Title H of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, entitled Regulatory Ac-
countability and Reform, requires agencies to prepare a detailed economic as-
sessment for any regulatory action that may result in the expenditure by the
State, local, or tribal governments, or by the private sector, of $100 million or
more in any one year.98 The assessment must include a "qualitative and quanti-
tative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits," and "estimates by the
agency of the effect [of the rule] on the national economy, such as the effect on
productivity, economic growth, full employment, creation of productive goods,
and international competition." 99 A regulatory initiative like one to regulate
respirable coal dust could easily meet the $100 million threshold of the Act,
requiring MSHA to spend a good deal of time evaluating the potential economic
impacts of such a standard before the standard even could be proposed.
Last, but hardly least, MSHA also has to comply with the Information
Quality Act of 2000, which requires agencies to issue guidelines to ensure the
"quality," "objectivity," "utility," and "integrity" of information that they dis-
seminate and to establish a process that permits affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information that fails to qualify under these benchmarks. °°
Congress left it to the Director of OMB to provide agencies guidance about how
to implement the Act's requirement, which OMB did in a detailed memorandum
issued in 2002, and which OMB augmented in 2004. For MSHA's purposes,
the key requirement imposed by OMB is that regulatory agencies must have
independent scientists peer review most of the scientific information dissemi-
nated by the government.10' This requirement would extend to scientific infor-
mation compiled by MSHA for regulatory purposes. Thus, in formulating a
respirable coal dust standard, MSHA might be required to submit the scientific
data that it relied on to support its standard to independent peer review.
Taken together, this string of hurdles MSHA would have to surmount to
issue a standard for respirable coal dust is daunting. That fact, however, hardly
excuses the agency's forty-year delay in addressing this hazard. But it does
98 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000).
99 Id. § 1532(a)(2)-(4).
100 Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-154 (2000); reprinted as note to 44
U.S.C. § 3516 (2000).
101 See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002); see also
OMB, Revised Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, Apr. 15, 2004,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer-review041404.pdf. In the only Information Qual-
ity Act challenge to make it to the court of appeals, the Fourth Circuit ruled that such claims were
not justiciable, finding that the challenger did not show injury-in-fact from the agency's dissemi-
nation of allegedly incorrect data. See Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006).
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explain why any agency - even one committed to safeguarding miner health -
would be reticent to take on such a formidable responsibility.
C. The Micro-Politics of MSHA Standard-Setting
The critique that I have made thus far focuses on structural barriers to
protective regulation that exist because Congress and the President have inde-
pendently determined to make rulemaking more difficult - in part to guarantee a
smarter and better regulatory output and in part to throttle back the pace of
rulemaking by agencies. These meta-political requirements apply across-the-
board, and have relatively the same effect on all agencies engaged in health and
safety regulation. They reflect a political judgment that, notwithstanding the
importance of protective regulation, agencies should, as a precondition to issu-
ing a regulation, be compelled to demonstrate that the regulation is essential to
public health; is based on solid science; and is cost effective.
With MSHA, there is also a complicated micro-political dynamic at
work that pushes the agency away from health regulation. MSHA is a small
agency, regulating a relatively small, discrete and cohesive industry - a circum-
stance that often leads to an agency being "captured" by the businesses it regu-
lates. It is easy to see how this happens. Agency officials work closely with
their counterparts in industry. They are all members of a small and well-defined
group of experts on a subject, so there is a natural interaction among them. In-
dustry representatives also rotate in and out of the government through a "re-
volving door" that leads directly to the boardrooms and law offices of regulated
industry. Over time, close relationships emerge and the agency begins to see
itself as much as an industry helpmate as a cop on the beat.'0 2 This problem is
especially acute in those agencies that regulate a single industry, like MSHA.
These agencies tend to form "partnerships" with the industries they regulate,
which translates into decreased enforcement efforts and lenient regulation, often
at the expense of public safety.
10 3
In recent years, this concern has taken on special force with MSHA,
since most of its senior political appointees during the Bush Administration
worked for the mining industry before their appointments to MSHA and pre-
102 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. AND
MGMT. Sci., 3, 11-13 (1971); see generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REv. 167 (1988).
103 See, e.g., PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981).
See also Review of Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration's Performance from 2001 to
2005 Reveals Consistent Abdication of Regulatory and Enforcement Responsibilities: Democratic
Staff, H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 10 9 th Cong. (2006) (setting forth in detail the
rollback in enforcement and rulemaking by MSHA during the Bush Administration); a list of the
rulemakings withdrawn during the Bush Administration is available at
http://www.minesafety.com/pdfs/MSHAWithdrawn.pdf; Cindy Skrzycki, Mining Safety Rules Got
the Shaft, Workers Union Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2004, at E01.
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sumably will return via the revolving door to industry positions after they leave
government service.1°4 Indeed, Bush-appointed MSHA Administrator David D.
Laurinski had worked for the mining industry for decades prior to his appoint-
ment and said, shortly after his appointment, "I don't think there's a whole lot of
difference" between "the private and public sectors."'
05
Laurinski's industry ties may have played a role in the agency's deci-
sion to abandon its rulemaking to reduce miner's exposure to respirable coal
dust. As a coal industry executive Laurinski actually advocated that MSHA's
dust standard be raised.'°6 When he was appointed to head MSHA, he did not
retreat from that view. Not only did he decide to withdraw MSHA's proposed
rulemaking to reduce by half permissible dust levels, but Laurinski also actually
proposed that the interim standard established by Congress should be abandoned
to permit mine operators to increase dust levels while miners would have to
wear clumsy, uncomfortable and notoriously ineffective respirators.'0 7 One
newspaper columnist ridiculed the idea by suggesting that readers should "try to
imagine wearing one [a respirator] for eight hours in a sweltering mine tunnel
hundreds of feet beneath the earth's surface."' 10 8 "Even the manufacturer of the
respirators, 3M, thought the idea was half-baked, suggesting that this was an
abdication of the responsibilities delegated by Congress to MSHA."' 9
Notions of moral hazard also may have played a role in MSHA's four-
decade long failure to address coal dust exposure. To put it bluntly, mine own-
ers have little economic incentives to clean up their mines to reduce coal dust
levels. For that reason, they are staunchly opposed to regulation to drive expo-
sures down. Why? For two reasons. First, black lung has no impact on produc-
tivity. When miners become disabled with black lung, mine operators replace
them with younger, healthy miners who may even command a lower wage.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, mine owners have managed to cap and
partially off-load their liability for black lung disease on both the companies that
buy coal and the American people. Since 1969, the federal government has
administered a compensation program for victims of black lung."0 Although
104 See Undermining Safety, supra note 4, at 21-26 (reporting on the deep industry ties of
MSHA's senior staff); Christopher Drew, Richard Oppel, Jr., & Claire Hoffman, Friends in the
White House Come to Coal's Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al.
105 James Nash, MSHA's New Administrator Means Business, 63 OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS 51,
51(2001).
106 See Undermining Safety, supra note 4, at 28.
107 Id.; see also Skrzycki, supra note 103.
108 See Undermining Safety, supra note 4, at 28.
109 Id. at 29 (quoting Drew et al., supra note 104).
110 Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (2000). Coal companies challenged the
constitutionality of the Act's provisions requiring the companies to pay benefits to former em-
ployees disabled by black lung, establishing rebuttable presumptions in favor of the miners, and
apportioning liability among mine owners. The Court upheld the statute, and its opinion provides
extensive detail about the origins and operations of the program. See Usery v. Turner Elkhom
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the program was initially conceived as a temporary federal program until state
workers' compensation programs took over, Congress amended the Act in 1977
- through the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) - to make it an ongoing federal
program."' Through 2004, payments under the program have exceeded $41
billion, and have provided compensation to nearly a million coal miners and
their families.' 1
2
The BLBA's purpose is to "provide benefits, in cooperation with the
states, to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis (black
lung) and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such
disease." 113 The BLBA allows current and former coal miners and their surviv-
ing dependents to file claims for black lung benefits." 4 As part of the 1977
amendments, Congress expanded the definition of pneumoconiosis to make it
easier for miners to get benefits.115 To be eligible for compensation, a claimant
is required to prove that the miner is disabled, the disability was caused by
pneumoconiosis, and the disability arose out of coal mine employment.' 16 The
United States Supreme Court has held that the miner need not show causation,
and that "[a]ll three of these conditions of eligibility are presumed if the claim-
ant was engaged in coal mine employment for at least 10 years and if the claim-
ant meets one of four medical requirements.""
7
The Department of Labor handles claims processing under the BLBA.
Although the program was initially funded by mine owners, the funding stream
was changed with the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, which im-
posed an excise tax on coal and established the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund (BLDTF)." 8 When mine operators are found to be responsible for the
miners' disability, they must pay compensation or reimburse the Trust Fund for
expenditures. Mine owners do not bear the full cost of the program. According
to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Trust Fund has absorbed a
substantial share of the cost because the excise tax has "not been adequate to
fund the program."" 9 Indeed, the GAO observed that as of 2008, the "fund had
borrowed over $8.7 billion from the federal treasury," with no expectation that
this money will be repaid.
20
II See Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2, 92 Stat. 95, 95
(1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 902). See also Donald T. DeCarlo, The Federal Black
Lung Experience, 26 How. L. J. 1335 (1983).
112 See generally GAO, Federal Compensation Programs: Perspectives on Four Programs for
Individuals Injured by Exposure to Harmful Substances 1-8, GAO-08-628-T (Apr. 1, 2008).
13 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2000).
14 Id. § 922.
11 See Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, § 2, 92 Stat. 95, 95.
116 Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 141 (1987).
117 Id. at 141-42 (setting forth medical conditions).
18 Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978).
"9 GAO, supra note 112, at 4, 6.
120 Id. at 4.
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To be sure, mine operators are still responsible for.the lion's share of
black lung benefits for current employees. But the benefits are far from gener-
ous, and the program effectively extinguishes any additional liability that might
accrue to mine operators. It is, in a real sense, an inexpensive insurance pro-
gram that insulates mine operators from the real costs of their failure to control
respirable coal dust - including unpaid wages and benefits that would have ac-
crued to the miner and his family and the value of the pain, suffering and devas-
tation that flows from a miner's slow death from black lung.12 1 As a result of
this cap on liability, mine operators have less incentive to invest in health im-
provements that might safeguard miners from the ravages of black lung than
would have if they had to internalize the full cost of black lung - a problem re-
flected in the rising rates of black lung among today's miners. This "moral haz-
ard" problem suggests an additional reason for MSHA's failure to act on respir-
able coal dust - industry has fixed its liability at a rate well below the real costs
to workers and therefore has no economic incentive to drive down exposure
rates.
The point here is not to condemn the federal black lung program, which
serves an indispensable compensatory function. Without it, miners afflicted
with black lung would suffer an even crueler fate. Rather, it is to suggest that
the existence of an essentially no-fault compensation fund for those unfortunate
enough to succumb to black lung is a safety valve that relieves some of the eco-
nomic and political pressure that might otherwise be brought to bear on fixing
mines to prevent this ongoing epidemic of black lung.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me end where I began. It is easy to see why an agency would re-
spond to the most urgent of pleas - the plea that the catastrophic accidents that
all too often claim miners' lives be rendered a thing of the past. No one wants
to face another Sago disaster.
To acknowledge the need for disaster prevention, however, is not to
suggest that we can turn a blind eye to the tragedy of black lung - a catastrophe
that claims far more lives, causes far more suffering, and is just as preventable.
Forty years ago, when Congress passed the first of the modern miner-
safety laws, it singled out black lung as the worst of many culprits. MSHA was
told in no uncertain terms to address that risk before all others. Forty years lat-
er, we see the consequences of MSHA's inaction in the rising rates of black lung
121 In 1980, the Department of Labor estimated that workers severely disabled by occupational
disease, and who received workers' compensation, received compensation that replaced only
about one-eighth of their lost wages. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INTERIM REPORT ON CONGRESS
TO OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, 76-77 (1980). See also Elinor P. Schroeder and Sidney A. Shapiro,
Responses to Occupational Diseases: the Role of Markets, Regulation and Information, 72 GEO.
L.J. 1231, 1246-50 (1984); NICHOLAS ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE AND INJURY 350 (1976).
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affliction among today's miners. At some point, enough is enough. 22 That
time is now.
122 In one of the lawsuits challenging OSHA's unreasonable delay in regulating ethylene oxide,
a highly toxic substance, the D.C. Circuit, fed up with the agency's delay, said that, "[a]t some
point, we must lean forward from the bench to let an agency know, in no uncertain terms, that
enough is enough." Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir.
1987). That sentiment seems particularly apt here.
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